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ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY
AMBIGUITY: DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
An Open Memorandum to Prime Minister
Netanyahu
LouIs RENE BERES'
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Shortly after coming to power, your predecessor, Shimon Peres,
took the unprecedented step of disclosing Israel's nuclear capability.
Responding to questions about the Oslo expectations and the extent of
Israeli concessions, Prime Minister Peres remarked that he would be
"delighted" to "give up the Atom" if the region would embrace a com-
prehensive and lasting peace. Although this remark was almost cer-
tainly not an expression of changed nuclear policy (i.e., the intent of the
remark was not to enhance Israeli nuclear power but to enhance the
"Peace Process"), it does point to an important national security ques-
tion: Should nuclear disclosure now become a conscious policy choice for
the State of Israel? This question, in turn, should be addressed together
with a comprehensive and informed consideration of another associated
question: What are the precise functions of Israeli nuclear weapons?
This Memorandum seeks to answer these vital and interrelated
questions. The question of disclosure is not a simple "yes" or "no" issue
(obviously the basic question was already answered by Peres's "offer"),
but rather, the extent of the subtlety and detail with which Israel
should now communicate its nuclear posture to minacious enemy
states. Regarding the question of nuclear function, the issue is not the
cost-effectiveness of a simple End of the Third Temple option, but
rather a much more complex investigation of doctrine, deployment, de-
1. Louis Rene Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is the author of many books and arti-
cles dealing with Israel's nuclear strategy. He is a member of the Advisory Board of Nativ
and The Center for Policy Research, and has lectured at the Dayan Forum, Likud Secu-
rity Group, Likud Chamber, National Defense College, the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies and the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. His strategic analyses have appeared
in such publications as STRATEGIC REVIEW, MIDSTREAM, COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, WORLD
POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,
ISRAEL AFFAIRS, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND
TERRORISM, PARAMETERS (U.S. Army War College) and SPECIAL WARFARE (JFK Special
Warfare Center). Recent articles by Professor Beres have been co-authored with AMB.
Zalman Shoval (VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.) and Col.Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (TEMP. J. INT'L
& COMP. L.). The June/July 1995 issue of MIDSTREAM featured what was to become a
widely reprinted debate on the Middle East Peace Process between Professor Beres and
Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit (Res.), former Chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch.
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terrence and defense.
Both of these overriding questions must be raised and explored
within the ongoing context of Oslo. The so-called "Peace Process" is now
the critical environment within which Israel's nuclear policy must be
fashioned and understood. Setting the parameters of Israeli military
power, this codified pattern of asymmetrical concessions presently ex-
hibits a principal imperative identified by Sun-Tzu in The Art of War:
"Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of
excellence." 2 Strengthened by Oslo, Israel's Arab/Islamic enemies are
rapidly reaching this pinnacle, while Israel is becoming ever more dis-
tant from it. With the Peace Process, the Palestinian Authority and its
allies are subjugating the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) with virtually no
risk to their own armies and terrorist operators.
During the middle-1980s, some students of Middle Eastern security
issues began to speak plainly of Israel's nuclear strategy with particular
reference to the question of disclosure. 3 Specifically, these scholars
asked whether this strategy should continue to be implicit, deliberately
ambiguous, and in the "basement," or whether it should be explicit,
clearly articulated, and out in the open.4 I entered the debate person-
ally with a series of lectures at the Israeli Strategic Studies Centers in
1984 and 1985 (the first two hosted by Maj. Gen. Res. Aharon Yariv at
Jaffee) and with the first edited book on the subject in 1986. 5 Today,
this debate no longer seems vital to Israeli strategists as it is perfectly
obvious that Israel has a significant number of nuclear weapons. That
being the case, they reason, there really is nothing further to disclose.
Israel is patently a member of the Nuclear Club and everyone already
knows it. Case closed!6
2. See SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 177 (Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., Westview Press
1994).
3. At that time, and even today, disclosure was treated generally as a dichotomous
variable, i.e., only two options presented themselves: disclosure or nondisclosure. This
memorandum is premised on the assumption, inter alia, that disclosure should be treated
by Israeli defense planners as a continuous variable. This would allow planners to iden-
tify multiple disclosure options along a continuum of possibilities. They can also choose
that particular level of disclosure that is presumed most gainful to Israeli nuclear re-
quirements.
4. The principal scholarly publication in this genre is SHAI FELDMAN, ISRAELI
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (1982). My argument for disclosure is substantially different from
Feldman's, rejecting any implicit comparisons with superpower nuclear deterrence and
expanding the pertinent essential functions of Israeli nuclear forces.
5. See SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis Rene Beres
ed., 1986). This anthology is comprised of chapters by the following scholars: Alan Dowty;
Gerald M. Steinberg; Avner Yaniv; Efraim Inbar; Zeev Eytan; Robert Harkavy; Avi Beker;
Stephen J. Cimbala; Robert A. Friedlander; Burns H. Weston; and Avner Cohen.
6. A related argument suggests that disclosure could exacerbate the regional nuclear
arms race, to Israel's distinct detriment. For example, Roger Molander and Peter Wilson
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But there is a serious problem with such reasoning. The rationale
for disclosure, of taking the bomb out of the "basement,"7 would not lie
simply in expressing the obvious. Rather, it would lie in the informed
understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel's security in a
number of different ways. All of these ways could benefit the Jewish
State, more or less, to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons
and associated strategies were disclosed. Indeed, as we shall now see,
the pertinent form and extent of disclosure8 could soon be more critical
than ever before because of the current Peace Process. 9
For the foreseeable future, Israel's state enemies - especially Iran 0
maintain that:
"[o]vert acceptance of Israel as a nuclear-armed state would undoubtedly
further stimulate nuclear weapons programs among the Arab states and
Iran so that a predictable sequel would be the eventual demand to grant le-
gitimacy to, say, nuclear arsenals in Iraq and Iran."
See Roger Molander & Peter Wilson, On Dealing With the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos, THE
WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 19, 23-4. There is, however, no evidence to support this par-
ticular argument which could, by extrapolation, be used very erroneously and possibly
with very grave consequences against disclosure.
7. But see SHLOMO ARONSON, THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OPACITY, THEORY AND REALITY 1960-1991, AN ISRAELI
PERSPECTIVE IX (1992). (indicating that an alternative image for nuclear ambiguity has
been "opacity" referring to "opaque nuclear cases"). This particular image is used to give
undeclared bombs a greater analytic subtlety. Id. "The adjective 'opaque' is derived from
physics. In this context, it can be used to describe what happens when one looks at an
object through a certain type of crystal. Depending upon how you hold the crystal, you
might not see the object clearly, it will be distorted. But if you hold the crystal 'properly,'
you will see the object very clearly indeed." Id.
8. Although not developed in this memorandum, the pertinent form and extent of
disclosure represent critical questions for future inquiry. What, precisely, should be the
optimal means of disclosure in different circumstances and in relation to different objec-
tives? What, exactly, should be the optimal levels of disclosure in these different circum-
stances and in relation to the seven different stated security functions of nuclear weap-
ons?
9. For an informed exploration of the Peace Process, see Louis Rene Beres, The
"Peace Process" and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 23 STRATEGIC REV. 35 (1995). The juridical
core of this process is the Israel-PLO Agreement, known widely as the Declaration of
Principles, concluded and signed in Oslo on August 19, 1993 and resigned in Washington,
D.C. on September 13, 1993. Generating a codified exchange of Israeli-administered ter-
ritories for Arab diplomatic guarantees, this process, especially if it is now continued, will
assuredly increase Israel's overall dependence on nuclear weapons.
10. For a detailed consideration of the Iranian military threat to Israel, see Louis
Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, UCLA J. INT'L
& FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the
Least Unattractive Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 187 (1996);
Louis Rene Beres, The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, 9 INT'L J.
INTELL. & COUNTERINTELL. 51, (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Prospects for
Nuclear War in the Middle East, 21 STRATEGIC REV. 52, (1993); Louis Rene Beres, Israel,
Iran and Nuclear War: A Tactical Assessment, SURVEY OF ARAB AFF. (1993).
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and Syria1 ' (but not excluding Egypt and Jordan) - continue to enlarge
and improve their conventional and unconventional military capabili-
ties. Although no one can conclusively predict that such improvements
are underway with Israel especially in mind, it would be prudent for Je-
rusalem to assume the worst. Moreover, even if enemy state intentions
do not yet parallel capabilities, this could change very rapidly. Here,
for example, Iranian capabilities could determine intentions, occasion-
ing chemical, biological 12 or nuclear first-strikes against Israel because
of expected tactical advantages.
To protect itself against enemy strikes, especially those attacks
with potential existential costs, Israel must exploit every component
function of its nuclear arsenal. 13 In this regard, the success of Israel's
efforts will depend in large part upon not only its particular configura-
tion of counterforce and countervalue operations, but also upon the ex-
tent to which this configuration is made known in advance to enemy
states. Consequently, before such an enemy is appropriately deterred
from launching first-strike attacks against Israel, or before it is de-
terred from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemp-
tion, it may not be enough that it knows that Israel has nuclear weap-
ons. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli weapons are
sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks and that they are targeted at
the enemy's own pertinent military installations. To fully understand
the ambiguity or disclosure question,1 4 we must first recall the theo-
11. For a detailed consideration of Syria, Israel and the Golan Heights, see Louis
Rene Beres & Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a Palestinian 'Entity' and the Golan
Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28 VAND. L. REV. 959, 959-71 (1995).
12. For Israel, biological weapons may be of somewhat less immediate concern than
chemical weapons. Although a growing number of states have or are now developing ca-
pabilities to employ living organisms (such as anthrax, lassa fever, or typhus, as opposed
to inert toxins), such capabilities would have limited military value. This is because their
dispersal mechanisms are difficult to manage. A change of wind could make them as le-
thal to the attacker as to the intended victim and it is difficult to sustain the living or-
ganism in biological weapons in hot climates. At the same time, precisely because biologi-
cal weapons are better suited for mass-destruction than for use as dedicated military
instruments, they could hold out greater appeal to Israel's irrational state enemies.
13. The seven essential functions that will be addressed herein are as follows: (1)
deterrence of large conventional attacks by enemy states; (2) deterrence of all levels of
unconventional attacks by enemy states; (3) preemption of enemy nuclear attacks; (4)
support of conventional preemptions against enemy state nuclear assets; (5) support of
conventional preemptions against enemy state non-nuclear assets; (6) nuclear war fight-
ing; and (7) the "Samson Option." For discussion of the "Samson Option", see Louis Rene
Beres, Israel and Samson: Some Tenuously Biblical Reflections on Strategy, JERUSALEM
LErrER/VIEWPOINTs, Feb. 1996, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
Samson chose suicide by pushing apart the temple pillars. This is a misleading analogy
because for states, the issue between "life" or "death" is not the same standard as for indi-
vidual persons.
14. It is assumed throughout this piece that such an understanding requires an ap-
propriate "strategic dialectic." In contrast to the standard literature in this field, which is
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retical foundations of nuclear war and deterrence 15 as they pertain to
Israel. These foundations concern prospective attackers' perceptions of
both Israel's nuclear capability and Israel's willingness to utilize them.
Removing the bomb from Israel's "basement" could, therefore, enhance
Israel's nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting postures to the ex-
tent that it would heighten enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem's ca-
pable nuclear forces and its willingness to use these forces in reprisal
for certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks.16
Mr. Prime Minister,
Let us look at these requirements more closely. To deter an enemy
attack or post-preemption retaliation, Israel must prevent an aggressor,
by threat of an unacceptably damaging reprisal or counter-retaliation,
from deciding to strike. Here, security is sought by convincing the po-
tential rational 17 attacker (irrational enemies are an altogether differ-
ent problem) that the costs of a considered attack will exceed the ex-
pected benefits. Assuming that Israel's state enemies: (1) value self-
preservation; and (2) always choose rationally between alternative op-
generally satisfied with fundamental reportorial forms of investigation, my method will be
to ask and answer questions, again and again, until core problems are confronted. Here,
we will approach our problem as an interrelated series of thoughts. Each thought pres-
ents a complication that moves inquiry onward to the next thought. Contained in this
strategic dialectic is an obligation to continue thinking, an obligation that, logically, can
never be fulfilled completely (because of what is called the "infinite regress problem", but
that must still be attempted as fully and as competently as possible. With such a dialecti-
cal form of investigation, we may focus upon appropriately dynamic and generic interac-
tions and synergies.
15. For discussion on the expected consequences of nuclear war fighting, see Louis
RENE BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); LOUIS
RENE BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(1983); LOUIS RENE BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD
ORDER (1984); LOUIS RENE BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (1986).
16. Contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom, nuclear deterrence and associ-
ated forms of Israel's nuclear posture, including preemption, can fully support the
authoritative expectations of international law. The adequacy of international law in
preventing nuclear war in the Middle East will depend upon far more than certain formal
treaties, customs, and general principles. It will depend, especially, upon the success or
failure of particular national strategies in the region. If Israel's nuclear strategy should
reduce the threat of nuclear war, either because of successful forms of nuclear deterrence
or because of essential preemptive strikes, possibly with the aid of some apt measure of
disclosure, this strategy should be considered as an authentic component of international
law enforcement.
17. Even if it could be assumed that enemy state leaders will always meet the expec-
tations of rational decision making, this would say nothing about the accuracy of informa-
tion used in making rational calculations. Rationality refers only to the intention of
maximizing specified values or preferences. It says nothing at all about whether the in-
formation used is correct or incorrect. Hence, rational leaders of enemy states may make
calculation errors that could lead their states to war against Israel.
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tions, they will always refrain from attacking an Israel that is believed
willing and able to deliver an appropriately destructive response.1 8
Two factors must communicate such a belief. First, in terms of
ability, there are two essential components: payload and delivery sys-
tem. It must be successfully communicated to the prospective attacker
that Israel's firepower and its means of delivering that firepower are
capable of wreaking unacceptable levels of destruction. This means
that Israel's retaliatory or counter-retaliatory forces must appear suffi-
ciently invulnerable and sufficiently elusive to penetrate the prospective
attacker's active and civil defenses. It need not be communicated to the
potential attacker that such firepower and the means of delivery are
superior. The capacity to deter need not be as great as the capacity to
"win."
With the bomb kept silently in the basement, enemy states could
conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-
preemption reprisal would be cost-effective. Were it made more plainly
obvious to enemy states contemplating an attack that Israel's bombs
met both payload and delivery system objectives, Israel's nuclear forces
would likely better serve their overriding security functions.
The second factor of nuclear communication for Israel concerns
willingness. How may Israel convince potential attackers that it pos-
sesses the resolve to deliver an immense destructive retaliation and
counter-retaliation? The answer to this question lies, in part, in Israel's
demonstrated strength of commitment to carry out such an attack and
in the precise nuclear weapons that would be available. Here, too, con-
tinued nuclear ambiguity could create the impression of an unwilling
Israel. Conversely, movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level
of disclosure could heighten the impression of an Israel that is willing to
follow through on its nuclear threats.
What then, are the plausible connections between a more openly
declared nuclear capability and enemy state perceptions of Israel's nu-
clear deterrence? One such connection concerns the relation between
disclosure and perceived vulnerability of Israeli nuclear forces from
preemptive destruction. Another such connection concerns the relation
18. My analysis is consistent with standard definitions of rationality in world politics.
I assume a unitary, value-maximizing decision maker with (1) one set of specified goals,
(2) one set of perceived options; and (3) a single estimate of the consequences that ensue
from each alternative. Thus, the enemy-state decision maker is assumed to evaluate al-
ternatives in his strategic environment on the basis of his preferences among them; to op-
erate according to a preference-ordering that is consistent and transitive; and to always
choose the preferred alternative. An often ignored problem with rationality assumptions
is that they concern only preference-maximizing intentions. An enemy state may meet all
of the requirements of rationality, but still commit errors in calculation that undermine
deterrence.
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between disclosure and perceived capacity of Israel's nuclear forces to
penetrate the attacking state's active defenses. Disclosure could repre-
sent a rational and prudent option for Israel to the extent that enemy
states are made appropriately aware of Israel's nuclear capabilities.
The operational benefits of disclosure would accrue from deliberate
flows of doctrinal information about such matters as dispersion, multi-
plication and hardening of nuclear systems and about some other tech-
nical features of certain nuclear weapons systems. Above all else, such
carefully controlled flows would serve to remove enemy doubts about
Israel's nuclear force capabilities, doubts which-if unchallenged-
could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence.
Removing the bomb from Israel's basement might also heighten en-
emy state perceptions of Jerusalem's willingness to make good on its
nuclear retaliatory threats. For example, by releasing information
about its nuclear weapons that distinctly identified "usable" forces, Is-
rael could remove enemy doubts about Jerusalem's nuclear resolve.
Here, a prospective attacker, aware that Israel could retaliate and gen-
erate intolerably high levels of civilian casualties (possibly because of
enhanced radiation 19 and/or sub-kiloton weapons) would be more likely,
because of Israel's disclosure, to believe Jerusalem's nuclear threats.
This brings us directly to the doctrinal question of counterforce and
countervalue. Counterforce strategies are those which target an en-
emy's strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructures. Such
strategies may be dangerous not only because of the collateral damage
they could produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood
of enemy first-strikes. Should Israel be "going for counterforce" with its
nuclear weapons? If so, enemy knowledge of such movement could en-
courage preemption planning by certain enemy states, but it could also
enhance the power of Israel's nuclear deterrent (because counterforce-
targeted nuclear weapons are more likely judged as usable). Depending
upon Jerusalem's rank-ordering of nuclear strategy values and its ex-
pectations concerning enemy state reactions, disclosure, or taking the
bomb out of the basement, could be more or less purposeful for Israel.
In contrast, countervalue strategies refer to the targeting of an en-
emy's cities and industries; in effect, the targeting of civilian popula-
19. The neutron bomb is often regarded as an especially unwholesome form of nu-
clear weapon. Yet, because its lethality is projected largely via radiation rather than
through concussion and heat, the neutron bomb could prove to be especially usable, and
with all attendant deterrent benefits. These issues were raised years ago in the context of
U.S. and NATO nuclear doctrine. The classic defense of nuclear radiation weapons was
offered by Samuel T. Cohen, who developed the technical-military concept of the neutron
bomb in 1958. See Samuel T. Cohen, Whither the Neutron Bomb? A Moral Defense of Nu-
clear Radiation Weapons, PARAMETERS J. OF THE U.S. ARMY WAR C., June 1981, at 19-
1998
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tions. Should Israel be content with developing the relatively inaccu-
rate apparatus of such an assured destruction posture, it could probably
limit the prospect of preemptive enemy first-strikes. This prospect could
even be limited further if the assured destruction posture were accom-
panied by open and fairly precise disclosure of Israel's non-threatening
nuclear stance. At the same time, should this posture fail to deter con-
certed enemy first-strikes, or enemy retaliations for Israeli preemp-
tions, its intrinsic damage-limiting inferiority to a counterforce capabil-
ity could produce much larger casualty figures. As we will soon see,
excessive countervalue targeting could impair Israel's nuclear war-
fighting needs. 20 If, on the other hand, Israel were to begin with a de-
clared nuclear counterforce posture, enemy state perceptions of inevita-
ble war with Israel could be enlarged. With such perceptions,
belligerent leaders would have to decide whether or not it would be
more gainful to await an Israeli preemption or whether to strike first
themselves. Aware of this, Israel's leaders must determine not only the
optimum configuration of countervalue and counterforce, but also the
most favorable means and levels of disclosure.
How should Israel choose in the aftermath of surrendering territo-
ries in exchange for "peace?" If Jerusalem should opt for nuclear deter-
rence based on mutually assured destruction, it would run the risk of
"losing" any nuclear war that might arise. If it should choose counter-
force measures, certain enemy states could feel especially threatened, a
condition that would likely heighten the actual prospects of nuclear
weapons use.
In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a para-
dox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to security and survival-
especially in a world made even more dangerous by the end of Israeli
strategic depth and by the incremental creation of Palestine 21-would
require recognizably usable nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weap-
ons were inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not de-
ter. Yet, the more usable the weapons become in order to enhance nu-
clear deterrence-a usability communicated more or less effectively by a
20. This is because weapons allocated to countervalue targeting functions would nec-
essarily take the place of counterforce targeted nuclear weapons.
21. For earlier writings by this author on the probable impact of a state of Palestine
upon Israeli strategies and security, see Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Pal-
estine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East, 19 STRATEGIC REV. 48 (1991);
Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War, 22 BULL. PEACE
PROPOSALS 227 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Accords and Israel's Nuclear Strategy,
5 GEO. COMPASS 74 (1995); Louis Rene Beres, A Palestinian State and Israel's Nuclear
Strategy, 31 CROSSROADS: INT'L SOCIO-POL. J. 97 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, A Palestinian
State: Implications for Israel's Security and the Probability of Nuclear War, 4 BULL.
JERUSALEM INST. W. DEF. 3 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The Question of Palestine and Is-
rael's Nuclear Strategy, 62 POL. Q. 451 (1991).
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shift away from deliberate ambiguity-the more likely it is that they
will actually be utilized. Although this paradox would appear to rec-
ommend, inter alia, the deployment of the least-harmful forms of usable
nuclear weapons, the likely absence of coordinated agreements with en-
emy states on deployable nuclear weapons points toward a different
conclusion: Unless Israel were to calculate that the more harmful
weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well
as for target states, there would be no tactical benefit for Israel to opt
for the least injurious usable nuclear weapons.
Regarding issues of nuclear usability, an excellent study has been
offered by two target planners and theater force analysts at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. While interested exclusively in the improvement
of U.S. nuclear strategy, the arguments presented by Thomas W.
Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II pertain instructively to Israel. In their
analysis, Dowler and Howard evaluate nuclear weapons with very low
yields ranging from 10 to 1000 tons. Seeking nuclear weapons whose
power is "effective but not abhorrent," the authors detail the particular
benefits of "micronukes" (weapons with a yield on the order of 10 tons or
20,000 pounds of high explosive); "mininukes" (weapons with a yield of
about 100 tons); and "tinynukes" (weapons with a yield of about 1000
tons or one kiloton).22
For Israel, a micronuke employed as an earth-penetrating warhead
[hereinafter EPW] could destroy all but the hardest command bunkers.
Deliverable by gravity bombs, tactical cruise missiles or tactical sur-
face-to-surface missiles, an EPW could also be used effectively to neu-
tralize airfields.
Should deterrence fail to prevent a launch of enemy missiles car-
rying nuclear or other mass-destruction warheads at Israeli forces, ei-
ther as a first-strike attack or as an enemy retaliation for Israeli pre-
emption, Israel would require an adequate defensive capability. To
acquire such a capability, Israel could benefit from an anti-tactical bal-
listic missile [hereinafter ATBM] 23 carrying a mininuke warhead.
Seeking to destroy incoming warheads in flight (simply knocking the
22. See Thomas W. Dowler & Joseph H. Howard II, Countering the Threat of the Well-
Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, 19 STRATEGIc REv. 34
(1991).
23. Presently the Arrow interceptor is the centerpiece of Israel's planned ballistic
missile defense system, part of a cooperative program with the United States Department
of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. The joint project began in May, 1986
when Israel and the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding. However "successful"
Arrow might ultimately be in tests, it is altogether likely that offensive weapons technol-
ogy exploited by Israel's enemies would enjoy an overwhelming advantage, especially if
their incoming warheads were nuclear. Considered together with prospects of enemy irra-
tionality, this suggests a compelling argument for ongoing Israeli preparation for perti-
nent preemption options.
1998
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missile off-target might not neutralize its capacity to inflict great harm
on Israeli forces), a mininuke fired by Israel could provide the needed
power. Such power could prove vital because an incoming nuclear,
chemical or biological warhead must be destroyed as far from its target
as possible.
Once an armed conflict had actually broken out between Israel and
certain enemy states, tinynuke warheads with yields of about 1000 tons
could prove effective against tank and troop units. True battlefield
weapons rather than agents of indiscriminate mass destruction, these
tinynukes-deliverable by tactical air-to-air surface missile, tactical
surface-to-surface cruise or ballistic missile, or artillery round -could
eliminate any company-sized unit. Intended for very precise operations
against known troop formations, these weapons would release lethal
radii on the order of 500 meters against tank crews and 600 meters
against infantry, artillery and support troops. As for the collateral
damage and safe standoff radii of these tinynukes, they would range
only to about 1500 meters. Moreover, utilized as airbursts, they should
produce no significant local fallout.24
Mr. Prime Minister,
Returning to the original doctrinal question of countervalue versus
counterforce, Israeli planners must commence prior investigations of
enemy state inclinations to strike first and in retaliation, and of associ-
ated inclinations to strike all-at-once or in stages. Should these plan-
ners assume, for example, that certain enemy states in the process of
"going nuclear" are apt to strike in an unlimited mode-i.e., to fire all
nuclear warheads-Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads,
used in retaliation or in counter-retaliation, would likely hit only empty
missile silos. In such circumstances, Israel's only rational application of
counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself.
If, for whatever reason, Israel were to reject the preemption option,
given the above assumptions there would be no good reason to opt for
counterforce. From the standpoint of compelling intra-war nuclear de-
terrence, a countervalue strategy could prove substantially more pur-
poseful under such assumptions. Should Israeli planners assume that
enemy states "going nuclear" are apt to strike first and to strike in a
limited mode, holding some significant measure of nuclear firepower in
reserve for follow-on strikes, Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear war-
heads, used in retaliation, could have meaningful damage-limitation ef-
fects. Here, counterforce operations could serve both an Israeli preemp-
tion or, should Israel decide, for whatever reason, not to preempt, an
Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should an Israeli first-strike be in-
tentionally limited, perhaps because it would be coupled with a guaran-
24. See Dowler & Howard II, supra note 22.
VOL. 26:2
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AMBIGUITY
tee of no further destruction in exchange for an end to hostilities, such
operations could serve an Israeli counter-retaliatory strike. This is the
case because Israel's attempt at intra-war deterrence could fail, occa-
sioning the need for follow-on strikes to produce essential damage-
limitation.
In order to examine fully whether Israel would be better served by
continued ambiguity or by disclosure (and if the latter, by what degrees
of disclosure), students of Israeli nuclear strategy must first identify
and understand the reasons behind Israel's nuclear forces. What, then,
are these particular reasons? Why, exactly, does Israel need nuclear
weapons? Once we can answer these antecedent questions we will be
able to determine if Israel's bomb should remain in the basement or if it
should be brought, more or less, into the country's "upper floors." In es-
sence, therefore, future scholarship in this area should be directed by
the following hypothesis: If Israel moves beyond "deliberate ambiguity"
to certain apt forms of "disclosure," its nuclear forces will be better able
to fulfill their seven essential security functions.
This does not imply, however, that if these seven essential func-
tions were fulfilled, Israel would necessarily be secure. Although I have
hypothesized that various and incremental levels of disclosure could
enhance Israel's nuclear deterrent and associated nuclear functions, Is-
rael should never give up its territory on the assumption that it could
rely entirely upon its nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons, appropriately
configured and disclosed, are necessary to national survival, but they
are not sufficient. Even a nuclear armed state needs a broad range of
weapons that are purposeful to the entire foreseeable spectrum of pos-
sible harms. It follows that those Israelis who currently argue for a
withdrawal to the 1949 borders because Israel has nuclear forces are
altogether mistaken. Israel must not become the first and only case in
history of a state totally dependent upon nuclear threats.
Optimally, Israel will take steps to maintain its all-important con-
ventional deterrence while, at the same time, ensuring that its nuclear
deterrence is informed by doctrine. Should this doctrine be left implicit,
as has been the Israeli case of "deliberate ambiguity" for decades, en-
emy states would need to reconstruct expectations about Israeli capa-
bilities and intentions. Should this doctrine be made explicit, as would
be the case if the bomb were removed from the "basement," these en-
emy states could extrapolate expectations from this doctrine directly.
Of course, it is conceivable that more explicit articulations of Israeli nu-
clear strategy would be distrusted or even discounted, but disclosure
would at least provide Israel with an opportunity for some input into
enemy state calculations.
For Israel, the advantages of disclosure would likely be greater
with respect to the deterrence of unconventional attacks than with re-
spect to deterrence of large conventional attacks. This is because the
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presumed plausibility of Israeli nuclear reprisal is apt to be greater
when unconventional weapons are used for aggression. A different as-
sumption about disclosure's advantages vis-a-vis large conventional at-
tacks could be reasonable if Israel were to couple its nuclear retaliatory
threats with far-reaching conventional disarmament and/ or with fur-
ther territorial concessions. However, such coupling, would represent a
tragic and potentially irretrievable error for the Jewish State.
No less tragic for Israel would be a decision to accept internation-
ally-imposed limitations on its nuclear arsenal, limitations that had
been urged especially by Egypt 25 and the United States 26 with the ap-
proach of the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT) back in
April 1995. With such a decision, the question of disclosure would be-
come moot. After all, volitional denuclearization consistent with ex-
pected NPT commitments would leave Israel with nothing to disclose.
Consequently, Israel's deterrence requirements would all have to be
met with conventional threats and/or U.S. "extended deterrence." This
would not be possible!27
Mr. Prime Minister,
Israel requires both conventional and nuclear weapons, comple-
mentary forces and doctrines to preserve the Third Temple into the
next millennium. Significantly, the Peace Process endangers both in-
terrelated requirements. Already, this Process, spawning shrinking
strategic depth, has curtailed the capacities of Israel's conventional
arms. For the very immediate future, it also threatens the capacities of
Israel's nuclear weapons, a situation that would not only leave the
bomb in the basement, but bury it there.
One last word about essential Israeli nuclear deterrence of enemy
unconventional attack, a need that could be served more or less effec-
25. See Abdel Monem Said Aly, In the Shadow of the Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyp-
tian Threat Perceptions, BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 151 (1996). Aly is Director of the Al-
Abram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. But cf. Louis Rene Beres,
Where the Shadow Really Falls: Why Israel Must Have Nuclear Weapons, BROWN J. OF
WORLD AFF. 127-38 (1997) (responding to Aly's article).
26. The U.S. pressure upon Israel to join the Nonproliferation Treaty brings to mind
the special foolishness of "extended nuclear deterrence" for Israel. Israeli planners should
understand that, for the United States, the central role of nuclear deterrence has de-
clined, and that extended deterrence is increasingly defined as conventional. This Ameri-
can view flows largely from President Bush's 1991 decision to eliminate ground-and sea-
based tactical nuclear weapons. See Charles T. Allan, Extended Conventional Deterrence:
In From the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?, THE WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 203 (dis-
cussing a comprehensive and insightful examination of extended conventional deter-
rence).
27. For an excellent assessment of these issues, see Gerald M. Steinberg, Israel, Egypt
and Nuclear Policy, JERUSALEM LETTERVIEWPOINTS, June 15, 1995, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr.
for Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
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tively by some apt measure of disclosure. Normally, strategic planners,
examining the requirements of nuclear deterrence, distinguish carefully
between conventional and unconventional attacks. For Israel today,
however, such a sharp distinction could be misleading and dangerous.
From now on, it is unlikely that enemy states would launch large con-
ventional attacks against Israel unless these states had backup uncon-
ventional (possibly, but not necessarily nuclear) forces. This means
that the capacity of Israeli nuclear deterrence will now always have to
be assessed vis-a-vis enemy state unconventional weapons. Hence, the
question of disclosure will now always have to be asked ultimately in
reference to nuclear deterrence of unconventional weapons.
It is conceivable, especially after Israel's ongoing surrender of terri-
tories, that some combination of enemy states, still effectively non-
nuclear, could conclude that a combined conventional attack against Is-
rael would be gainful. To prevent such a conclusion, thereby main-
taining successful nuclear deterrence, Jerusalem would need to con-
vince these enemy states that their prospective combined conventional
assault could elicit a full nuclear reprisal. This task could be made
easier by appropriate communications to enemy states concerning dis-
closure, including purposeful communications of Israel's awareness that
the conventional/unconventional threshold might still be breached first
by the conventional enemy state attackers. Although it is likely that
this task could also be made easier because of Israel's already-truncated
strategic depth, the net effect of such truncation for Israel would surely
be negative. Halting the misnamed "Peace Process" should therefore be
a clear and overriding strategic imperative.
Mr. Prime Minister,
Over the years, there has been surprisingly little open discussion in
Israel on the topic of the Jewish State's nuclear strategy and nuclear
program. Now, however, as the Oslo Process approaches a critical
stage, Israel's dependence upon nuclear weapons will certainly be en-
larged. Moreover, as the question of "deliberate ambiguity" versus dis-
closure represents an important component of Israel's nuclear strategy,
this question, too, will demand increased scrutiny. With this in mind,
let us now proceed to our second basic issue, the functions of Israeli nu-
clear weapons and policy.
Why Israel Needs Nuclear Weapons
Although much has been written about the alleged configuration of
Israel's nuclear arsenal, and about the rationale of such frightful weap-
ons, not a single systematic examination of this rationale has ever been
published. Hence, both supporters and opponents of Israel's presumed
nuclear force appear to share a naive view that the sole purpose of this
force is as a last resort operation, as an instrument of vengeance to be
activated only when the State of Israel is already beyond rescue. As the
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following analysis makes clear, however, this view is certainly wrong.
While the "Samson Option 28 has its proper place in Israel's nuclear
posture, it is a relatively minor place, one overshadowed by the far more
essential requirements of deterrence and preemption.
Why, then, does Israel need nuclear weapons? Here is a serious
and comprehensive answer:
1. Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter large conventional attacks
by enemy states. The effectiveness of such Israeli nuclear deterrence
will depend, among other things, upon: (a) perceived vulnerability of Is-
raeli nuclear forces; (b) perceived destructiveness of Israeli nuclear
forces; (c) perceived willingness of Israeli leadership to follow through
on nuclear threats; (d) perceived capacities of prospective attacker's ac-
tive defenses; (e) perceptions of Israeli targeting doctrine; (f) percep-
tions of Israel's probable retaliatory response when there is an expecta-
tion of non-nuclear but chemical and/or biological counter-retaliations;
(g) disclosure or continued nondisclosure of Israel's nuclear arsenal; and
(h) creation or non-creation of a Palestinian state.
2. Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter all levels of unconventional
chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks (CBN). The effectiveness of
these forms of Israeli nuclear deterrence will also depend, on the fac-
tors enumerated in paragraph 1. In this regard, Israel's nuclear weap-
ons are needed to deter enemy escalation of conventional warfare to un-
conventional warfare and of one form of unconventional warfare to
another (i.e., escalation of chemical warfare to biological warfare, bio-
logical warfare to chemical warfare, or biological/chemical warfare to
nuclear warfare).
3. Israel needs nuclear weapons to preempt enemy nuclear attacks.
This does not mean that Israeli preemptions of such attacks would nec-
essarily be nuclear (more than likely, they would, in fact, be non-
nuclear), but only that they could be nuclear. Of course, should Israel
ever need to use its nuclear forces for such a purpose, it would signify
the failure of these forces as a deterrent (as per number 2, above). Sig-
nificantly, such failure is increasingly plausible because of the problem-
atic nature of nuclear deterrence in general and in the particular cir-
cumstances present in the Middle East.
4. Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemp-
tions against enemy nuclear assets. With such weapons, Israel can
maintain, explicitly or implicitly, a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation.
Without such weapons, Israel, having to rely entirely on non-nuclear
forces, might not be able to deter enemy retaliations for the Israeli pre-
28. See Louis Rene Beres, Israel and Samson: Some Tenuously Biblical Reflections
on Strategy, JERUSALEM LETTERVIEWPOINTS, February 1996, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr. for
Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
VOL. 26:2
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AMBIGUITY
emptive attack.
5. Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemp-
tions against enemy non-nuclear conventional, chemical, or biological
assets. With such weapons, Israel can maintain, explicitly or implicitly,
a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation. Without such weapons, Israel,
having to rely entirely on non-nuclear forces, might not be able to deter
enemy retaliations for the Israeli preemptive attack.
6. Israel needs nuclear weapons for nuclear warfighting. Although,
in the best of all possible worlds, this need will never have to arise, it
cannot be discounted. Rather, it must be taken seriously by Israeli
planners and decision-makers. Among the probable paths to nuclear
warfighting are the following: enemy nuclear first-strikes against Is-
rael; enemy non-nuclear first-strikes against Israel that elicit Israeli
nuclear reprisals, either immediately or via incremental escalation pro-
cesses; Israeli nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nuclear
assets; Israeli non-nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nu-
clear assets that elicit enemy nuclear reprisals, either immediately or
via incremental escalation processes. Other pertinent paths to nuclear
warfighting include accidental, unintentional, or inadvertent nuclear
attacks among Israel and regional enemy states and even the escalatory
consequences of nuclear terrorism against the Jewish State.29 As long
as it can be assumed that Israel is determined to endure, there are con-
ditions where Jerusalem could resort to nuclear warfighting. This holds
true if: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Israel's
second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for Israeli con-
ventional preemption would not destroy Israel's nuclear counter-
retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear
weapons would not destroy enemy second-strike nuclear capabilities;
and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not
destroy enemy nuclear counter-retaliatory capabilities. It follows, from
the standpoint of Israel's nuclear requirements, that Jerusalem should
prepare to do what is needed to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b)
above, and avoid the possibility of (c) and (d).
7. Israel needs nuclear weapons for the "Samson Option." Although
such a use of nuclear weapons, by definition, would be profoundly cata-
strophic, Israel apparently understands that it would be better to "die
29. See Louis Rene Beres, Confronting Nuclear Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 129 (1990); Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terror-
ism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1994); LOUIS RENE BERES, ISRAEL, THE 'PEACE
PROCESS' AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 767 (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Preventing the 'Blood-Dimmed Tide:' How to
Avoid Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States, 24 STRATEGIC REV. 76 (1996); Louis
Rene Beres, The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurispru-
dential View, 12 DICK. J. INT'LL. 327 (1994).
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with the Philistines" than to die alone. This understanding is much
more than a matter of Jewish honor and of a refutation of the so-called
"Masada complex" (suicide without punishment of the aggressor). It
could, depending upon the awareness by enemy states, represent an in-
tegral and indispensable element of Israel's nuclear deterrent. Moreo-
ver, the biblical analogy is somewhat misleading. Samson chose suicide
by pushing apart the temple pillars, whereas Israel, using nuclear
weapons as a last resort, would not be choosing suicide or even neces-
sarily committing suicide. For states, the criteria of "life" and "death"
are hardly as clear-cut as they are for individual persons. Finally, it is
essential that Israel's leaders, in considering possible uses of nuclear
weapons, regard the Samson Option as one to be precluded by correct
resort to all other nuclear options. Stated differently, a resort to the
"Samson Option," by Israel, would imply the complete failure of all
other options and of the failure of its nuclear weapons to provide essen-
tial national security.
Let us examine the deterrence options.
We have seen that Israel needs nuclear weapons, among other pur-
poses, to deter large conventional attacks and all levels of unconven-
tional attack by enemy states. Yet, the effectiveness of nuclear weapons
in meeting these needs is limited and exceedingly problematic. Indeed,
even if Jerusalem should move toward partial or full disclosure of its
nuclear weapons, Israel cannot reasonably rely upon nuclear deter-
rence for survival.
Aware of these limitations, Israel must nonetheless seek to
strengthen nuclear deterrence such that an enemy state will always
calculate that a first-strike upon the Jewish State would be irrational.
This means taking steps to convince the enemy state that the cost of
such a strike will always exceed the benefits. To accomplish this impor-
tant objective, Israel must convince prospective attackers that it main-
tains both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear
weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel
would be unconvinced about either one or both of these essential com-
ponents of nuclear deterrence, it might choose to strike first, depending
upon the particular value or utility it places upon the expected conse-
quence of such an attack.
Regarding willingness, even if Jerusalem were prepared to respond
to certain attacks with nuclear reprisals, enemy failure to recognize
such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Here, misper-
ception and/or errors in information could immobilize nuclear deter-
rence. It is also conceivable that Jerusalem would, in fact, lack willing-
ness to retaliate, and that this lack of willingness is perceived correctly
by enemy decision-makers. In this case, Israeli nuclear deterrence
would be immobilized not because of "confused signals," but because of
signals that had not been properly distorted.
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Regarding capacity, even if Jerusalem maintains a substantial ar-
senal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states believe these
weapons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack
is believed capable of destroying Israel's arsenal, the Jewish State's
nuclear deterrent will be immobilized. Moreover, even if Israel's nu-
clear weapons were configured such that they could not be destroyed by
an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about
Israeli vulnerability could still occasion the failure of nuclear deter-
rence. A further complication here concerns enemy state deployment of
anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses, which might contribute to an at-
tack decision against Israel by lowering the attacker's expected costs.
The importance of "usable" nuclear weapons must also be examined
from the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weap-
ons be perceived by a would-be attacker as very high yield, indiscrimi-
nate, "city busting" weapons, rather than minimal-yield, warfighting
weapons, they might not deter. Contrary to the uninformed conven-
tional wisdom on the subject, successful nuclear deterrence, to the ex-
tent possible, may actually vary inversely with perceived destructive-
ness. It follows that Israeli nuclear deterrence requires not only secure
second-strike forces, but also forces that could be used productively in
war.
All this brings to mind the crucial connections between disclosure,
doctrine and deterrence. To the extent that Israel's strategic doctrine
actually identifies nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal-forms
calibrating Israeli retaliations to particular levels of provocation-dis-
closure of such doctrine (at least in its broadest and most unspecific
contours) could contribute to Israel's nuclear deterrence. Without such
disclosure, Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about Jerusalem's
probable responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could
serve Israel's security for a while longer, but-at one time or another-
might fail altogether.
Mr. Prime Minister,
In looking over nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, Israeli
planners must also pay close attention to the assumption of rational-
ity.30 Assessments of Israeli nuclear deterrence always assume a ra-
tional state enemy. But the assumption of rationality is enormously
30. Israel's planners should be reminded of M. Unamuno's instructive remark about
the philosopher Hegel. "Hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is real and
all the real rational; but there are many of us who, unconvinced by Hegel, continue to be-
lieve that the real, the really real, is irrational, that reason builds upon irrationalities."
For Israel, faced with the prospect of unconventional aggression from enemy states, it
would be prudent to "build upon irrationalities," i.e., upon the expected irrationalities of
an increasingly formidable configuration of enemies. See MIGUEL DE UNNAMUNO, TRAGIC
SENSE OF LIFE 5 (1921).
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problematic. There is, in fact, absolutely no reason to assume that pro-
spective attackers of Israel will always choose among possible options
according to careful comparisons of expected costs and expected bene-
fits. As long as such enemies are increasingly capable of missile attacks
upon Israel and so long as Jerusalem is unable to intercept these at-
tacks with near-perfect or possibly even perfect reliability, this means
that Israeli dependence upon nuclear deterrence could have altogether
catastrophic consequences.
Where should Israel go from here? Recognizing the fatal limita-
tions of any Peace Process, the Jewish State must now seek security be-
yond the protections offered by nuclear deterrence. It must, as we shall
see, prepare for preemption against pertinent military targets. Al-
though many will find even such preparation "aggressive" or "uncivi-
lized," the alternative may well be to accept destruction of the Jewish
State as inevitable. Moreover, as I have written widely in professional
law journals,31 the right of preemption is well-established under inter-
national law.
Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine the preemption options.
We have seen that among other purposes, Israel needs nuclear
weapons to undertake and/or to support various forms of preemption.
In making its preemption decisions, Israel must determine whether
such essential defensive strikes, known jurisprudentially as expressions
of anticipatory self-defense,3 2 would be tactically cost-effective. This
would depend upon a number of critical variables, including: (a) ex-
pected probability of enemy first-strikes; (b) expected cost of enemy
first-strikes; (c) expected schedule of enemy unconventional weapons
deployment; (d) expected efficiency of enemy active defenses over time;
e) expected efficiency of Israeli active defenses over time; (f) expected
efficiency of Israeli hard-target counterforce operations over time; (g)
expected reactions of unaffected regional enemies; and (h) expected U.S.
31. See Louis Rene Beres & Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's De-
struction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L COMP. L.J. 437 (1995).
32. For scholarly examination of anticipatory self-defense, with particular reference
to Israel, see Louis Rene Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipa-
tory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111 (1993); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13
HOUS. J.INT'L L. 259 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, Striking 'First. Israel's Post Gulf War Op-
tions Under International Law, 14 LOY.L.A.INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis Rene
Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89 (1991); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,' and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Force and International Law:
Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 JERUSALEM J. INT'L RELATIONS 1 (1991). For an
examination of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel,
see Louis Rene Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1991).
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and world community reactions to Israeli preemptions.
Regarding preemption options, Israel's overall question is this: As
Jerusalem must plan for such forms of anticipatory self-defense, against
which particular configurations of hard targets should they be directed
and when should they be mounted? If it is assumed that enemy states
will only add to their chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals, and
that these additions will make effective Israeli preemptions more and
more difficult, if not altogether impossible, rational Israeli strategy
would seem to compel Jerusalem to strike defensively as soon as possi-
ble. If, however, it is assumed that there will be no significant en-
largement or deployment of enemy unconventional weapons over time,
this may suggest a diminished rationale for Israel to strike first.
Israel's inclinations to strike preemptively in certain circumstances
could also be affected by the steps taken by prospective target states to
guard against Israeli preemption. Should Israel refrain too long from
striking first, enemy states could implement protective measures that
would pose additional hazards to Israel. These measures include the
attachment of certain launch mechanisms to nuclear weapon systems,
and/or the adoption of "launch-on-warning" policies. Such policies
would call for the retaliatory launch of bombers and/or missiles on mere
receipt of warning that a missile attack is underway. Requiring a
launch before the attacking warheads actually reached their intended
targets, "launch-on-warning" policies clearly carry grave risks of error.
Ideally, Israel would do everything possible to prevent such meas-
ures from being installed in the first place, especially because of the ex-
panded risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks against its arma-
ments and population centers. Yet, if such measures should become a
reality, Jerusalem might still calculate that a preemptive strike would
be cost-effective. This is because an expected enemy retaliation, how-
ever damaging, might still appear less unacceptable than the expected
consequences of enemy first-strikes.
Perhaps the single most important factor in Israeli judgments on
the preemption option will be the expected rationality of enemy decision-
makers. If, after all, these leaders could be expected to strike at Israel
with unconventional forces irrespective of anticipated Israeli counter-
strikes, deterrence, as we have already seen, would not work. This
means that enemy strikes could be expected even if enemy leaders un-
derstood that Israel had successfully deployed its own nuclear weapons
in survivable modes, that Israel's weapons were entirely capable of
penetrating enemy active defenses, and that Israel's leaders were alto-
gether willing to retaliate.
Faced with an irrational enemy bent upon unconventional aggres-
sion, Israel could have no effective choice but to abandon reliance on
traditional modes of nuclear deterrence. Even if it is not faced with an
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irrational enemy, however, Israel will have to plan carefully for pre-
emption options, planning that must take into account Jerusalem's nu-
clear weapons. In the course of such planning, it will be important to
recognize that enemy capabilities and intentions are not separate but
interpenetrating, interdependent and interactive. This means: (1) ca-
pabilities affect intentions and vice-versa; and (2) the combined effects
of capabilities and intentions may produce policy outcomes that are
greatly accelerated and/or are more than the simple sum of these ef-
fects.
Let us consider the particular dangers from Iran. For the moment,
those who would downplay the Iranian threat to Israel often argue that
Teheran's unconventional capabilities remain problematic and/or that
its willingness to attack Israel- fundamentalist ideologies notwith-
standing-is assuredly very low. Yet, over the next several years, that
country's development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
could be substantial, creating conditions whereby a first-strike against
Israel might be construed as altogether rational. Whether correct or in-
correct in its calculations, an Iranian leadership that believes it can
strike Israel with impunity, near-impunity or at least without incurring
what it defines as unacceptable costs, could be strongly motivated to
undertake such a strike. Such motivation would be heightened to the
extent that Iran remained uncertain about Israel's own preemption
plans. Here, Iranian capabilities would affect, and possibly even de-
termine, Iranian intentions.
The Iranian threat to Israel might, on the other hand, originate
from a different direction. In this scenario, Iran's intentions toward the
Israel, irremediably hostile and perhaps even genocidal,33 could ani-
mate Teheran's development of unconventional military capabilities.
Here, representing genuinely far-reaching international hatred rather
than mere bluster and propagandistic bravado, Iranian diatribes
against Israel would ensure the production and deployment of extraor-
dinarily destructive forces, weapons and postures that could threaten
33. For writings on the subject of genocide, see LOUIS RENE BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE
THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF US FOREIGN POLICY (1987); LOUIS RENE BERES,
PUNISHING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AFTER THE GULF WAR: IRAQI
CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (1992); LOUIs RENE BERES, REASON AND
REALPOLITIK: US FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1994); Louis Rene Beres, After the
Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 (1991);
Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, State and Self, 18 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL. 37 (1989); Louis
Rene Beres, International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 25 (1989); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, Law and Power Politics, 10
WHITTIER L. REV. 329 (1988); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide and Power Politics: The Indi-
vidual and the State, 18 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 73 (1987); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide
and Genocide-Like Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 27 (M. Cherif Balliouni,
ed.,1986); Louis Rene Beres, Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Preven-
tion of Genocide, 30 CHITTY'S L.J. 223 (1982).
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the Third Temple. What I have been describing are circumstances
where Iranian intentions could affect, and possibly even determine,
Iranian capabilities--circumstances that now warrant careful attention
in Jerusalem.
But what if Iran's intention toward Israel were not irremediably
hostile or genocidal? What if its public bombast were not an expression
of genuinely belligerent motivations, but a position designed entirely for
intranational and international political consumption? The short and
obvious answer to these questions is that such shallow and contrived
intentions would not impact Iranian capabilities vis-a-vis Israel. Yet,
upon reflection, it is likely that even unauthentic expressions of intent
could, over time, become authentic, and that repeated over many years,
in the manner of an incantation, such expressions could become self-
fulfilling.
It follows that it would be premature for Israel to draw comfort
from the argument that Iranian intentions are effectively harmless.
Rather, such intentions could decisively impact capabilities over time.
Backed by appropriate nuclear weapons, preemption options, therefore,
must remain open and viable to Israel.
An important factor in our discussion of intentions, capabilities and
preemption options is the increasingly problematic Peace Process. Con-
ventional wisdom has been quick to suggest that this process, by dem-
onstrating and codifying Israel's commitment to peaceful settlement of
disputes, diminishes the enemy (Iranian) threat. After all, wouldn't
world public opinion uniformly condemn Iran for any act of aggression
directed against Israel? And wouldn't, therefore, Iranian aggressive in-
tentions be reduced or even removed, a change that could slow down
Teheran's pertinent unconventional militarization and consequently the
overall danger to Israel from that enemy state?
Probably not! The conventional wisdom may be wrong, or merely
partial. Following the Oslo Agreement, Israel's inclination to preempt
enemy aggression has likely been diminished. After all, the entire
global community would frown upon such preemption in the midst of an
ongoing, incremental search for "peace" in the region.
If Iran should recognize these effective inhibitions on Israeli pre-
emption options (and there is every reason to believe that they would
recognize these inhibitions), that enemy state could calculate as fol-
lows: "As our (Iranian) militarization will be less threatened by Israeli
preemptive attack during the Peace Process,' we (Iran) should increase
our capabilities-especially our unconventional weapons capabilities-
as quickly as practicable." Such a calculation, as we now know, could
enlarge Iranian intentions to attack Israel and could make cost-effective
hostile actions by Iran that would not otherwise even have been consid-
ered or even have been possible.
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If the Peace Process produces a Palestinian state, the effects on
enemy capabilities and intentions, and therefore on Israeli preemption
options, will be significant. Here, Israel's substantial loss of strategic
depth could be recognized by enemy states as a significant military li-
ability for Jerusalem. Such recognition, in turn, could worsen enemy
intentions against Israel, occasioning an accelerated search for capabili-
ties and consequently a heightened risk of war.
Israel could foresee such enemy calculations and seek to compen-
sate for the loss of territories in a number of different ways. Jerusalem
could decide that it was time to take its bomb out of the "basement" as a
deterrence-enhancing measure, 34 but this might not be enough of a
productive strategy. It could, therefore, accept a heightened willingness
to launch preemptive strikes against enemy hard targets, strikes
backed by Israeli nuclear weapons. Made aware of such Israeli inten-
tions, intentions that would derive from Israel's new territorial vulner-
abilities, enemy states could respond in a more or less parallel fashion,
preparing more openly and more quickly for nuclearization and/or for
first-strike attacks against the Jewish State.
Taken by itself, a Palestinian state would affect the capabilities
and intentions of both Israel and its enemies. But if such a state were
created at the same time that Israel reduced or abandoned its nuclear
weapons capabilities, the impact could be even more substantial. This
scenario should not be dismissed out of hand. Depending upon Israeli
government responses to Egyptian and other demands, it could become
very real.
What would happen if Israel were to relinquish its nuclear options
by acceding to enemy demands and by accepting a Palestinian state?
Under such circumstances, Israel would not only be vastly more vul-
nerable to enemy first-strikes, it would also be deprived of its essential
preemption options. This is the case because Israeli counter-retaliatory
deterrence would be immobilized by reduction or removal of its nuclear
weapons potential and because Israeli preemptions could not possibly
be one hundred percent effective against enemy unconventional forces.
A less than one hundred percent level of effectiveness could be tolerable
if Israel had an operational anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capa-
bility, but such a capability is presently unavailable and is forseeably
doubtful. 35
34. See LOUIS RENE BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(1986); Louis Rene Beres, Israel's 'Bomb in the Basement:' A Second Look, 2 ISRAELI
AFFAIRS 112 (1995).
35. Israel's current anti-missile defense programs include the Arrow ATBM; the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Boost Phase Intercept (a multi-layered
system designed to destroy enemy missiles in their initial flight phase); and the Nautilus
Program (a survivor of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative aimed to evaluate lasers as a
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Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine Israel's nuclear warfighting op-
tions.
However much scholars may wish to deny it, Israel needs nuclear
weapons, among several other essential purposes, for actual nuclear
warfighting. Should nuclear deterrence and/or preemption options fail,
Israel's "hard target" capabilities could be critical to national survival.
These capabilities, of course, would depend, in part, upon appropriate
nuclear weapons.
What, exactly, would be "appropriate?" Instead of Armageddon
type weapons, Israel needs to develop precision, low-yield nuclear war-
heads that could reduce collateral damage to acceptable levels and hy-
pervelocity nuclear warheads that could overcome enemy active de-
fenses. Israel would also benefii from the use of radio-frequency
weapons, nuclear warheads that are tailored to produce as much elec-
tromagnetic pulse as possible, destroying electronics and communica-
tions over wide areas.
Regarding the nuclear weapons needed by Israel for nuclear war-
fighting, Jerusalem requires an intermediate option between capitula-
tion on the one hand and resorting to inappropriately large nuclear
weapons on the other. To define and better understand this intermedi-
ate option, Israeli planners could extrapolate productively from an ex-
cellent study prepared by two well-informed target planners and thea-
ter force analysts at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Although
directed toward United States nuclear strategy only, the compelling ar-
guments cited earlier by Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II
pertain instructively to the problem at hand, i.e., Israeli security and
nuclear warfighting options.36
Of course, all such discussion will be objectionable to people of
feeling and sensitivity. It would, after all, be far better (and certainly
more "correct") to speak of nuclear arms control or sustainable nuclear
deterrence than of nuclear warfighting. Yet, the Middle East remains a
particularly dangerous neighborhood, and failures to confront the most
terrible possibilities could bring the most horrific harms. For Israel, a
state that yearns for peace and security more than any other in this
neighborhood-a state born out of the ashes of humankind's most terri-
ble crime-genocide looms both as a memory and as an expectation. 37
tactical air defense against rockets, mortars and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles).
36. See Dowler & Howard II, supra note 22.
37. War and genocide need not be mutually exclusive. According to Articles II and III
of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide in-
cludes any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group as such." Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
(1951). If Israel is recognized as the institutionalized expression of the Jewish People (an
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Resisting the short-term temptations of security regimes and confidence
building measures, its leaders must always plan accordingly.
Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine the Samson Option
We have seen that Israel needs nuclear weapons, additional to the
other essential rationales already discussed, for "last resort" purposes.
Although this is certainly the least important need-since, by defini-
tion, actual resort to the Samson Option would reveal failure and col-
lapse of all essential security functions-it is not unimportant. This is
because Israeli preparation for last resort operations could play a role in
enhancing Israeli nuclear deterrence, preemption and warfighting re-
quirements, and therefore-at least in part-reducing the risks of re-
gional nuclear exchanges.
Regarding prospective contributions to Israeli nuclear deterrence,
preparation for a Samson Option could help to convince would-be at-
tackers that aggression would not prove beneficial. This is especially
the case if Israeli preparation were coupled with some level of disclo-
sure, and if Israel's pertinent Samson weapons appeared to be suffi-
ciently invulnerable to enemy first-strikes. In view of what strategists
sometimes call the "rationality of pretended irrationality," Samson
could also aid Israeli nuclear deterrence by demonstrating a willingness
to take existential risks.
In relation to prospective contributions to preemption options,
preparation for a Samson Option could convince Israel that essential
defensive first-strikes could be undertaken with diminished expecta-
tions of unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This would de-
pend, of course, upon antecedent Israeli decisions on disclosure, on Is-
raeli perceptions of the effects of disclosure on enemy retaliatory
prospects, on Israeli judgments about enemy perceptions of Samson
weapons vulnerability, and on enemy awareness of Samson's counter-
value force posture. As in the case of Samson and Israeli nuclear deter-
rence, last-resort preparations could assist Israeli preemption options
by displaying a willingness to take certain existential risks. But Israeli
planners must be mindful here of pretended irrationality as a double-
edged sword. Brandished too irrationally, Israeli preparations for a
Samson Option could encourage enemy preemptions.
Regarding prospective contributions to Israel's nuclear warfighting
options, preparation for a Samson Option could convince enemy states
that a clear victory would be impossible to achieve. But here, it would
be important for Israel to communicate to potential aggressors the fol-
lowing understanding: Israel's countervalue-targeted Samson weapons
are additional to (not at the expense of) its counterforce-targeted war-
expression that would include national, ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of
war intended to destroy the Jewish State could certainly be genocidal.
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fighting weapons. In the absence of such communication, preparations
for a Samson Option could effectively impair, rather than reinforce Is-
rael's nuclear warfighting options.
Mr. Prime Minister,
Whether one likes it or not, Israel needs nuclear weapons. These
weapons are required to fulfill essential deterrence options, preemption
options, warfighting options, and even the Samson Option. It follows
that such weapons should not be negotiated away in formal interna-
tional agreements, especially in the midst of any so-called "Peace Proc-
ess." It follows as well that particular nuclear weapons policies should
now be made in cumulative conformance with: (a) the examined bene-
fits of disclosure; and (b) the seven pertinent options that have been
discussed and, more broadly, with the ever-changing strategic environ-
ment of regional and world power configurations. In the final analysis,
regrettable as it may appear, the ultimate structure of Israeli security
will be built largely upon the foundations of nuclear weapons, and not
on security regimes, confidence building measures, or illusory peace
processes. 38 Should these foundations be constructed carefully, with
due regard for underlying theoretical soundness, they could assure that
nuclear weapons will never be used in the Middle East.
In the best of all possible worlds, such reaffirmation of Realpolitik
would be vulgar and inappropriate. Yet, we do not live in an optimal
world order, and individual states-still operating within the self-help
seventeenth-century dynamics fashioned at Westphalia after the Thirty
Years War-have an overriding obligation to endure. To meet this obli-
gation, as indeed it must, the State of Israel must never lose sight of an
antecedent requirement: the obligation to understand, maintain and
use its essential military power.
38. For devout Muslims, "peace with Israel was and still remains nothing less than
a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a symptom of its profound malaise, weakness
and decadence." ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTI-SEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED 227 (1991).
The Prophet is said to have predicted a final war to annihilate the Jews, saying: "The
Hour [i.e. salvation] would not come until you fight against the Jews; and the stone would
say, '0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill him'." ARAB THEOLOGIANS ON
JEWS AND ISRAEL: EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF
THE ACADEMY OF IsLAMIC RESEARCH 49-51 (D.F. Green, ed., 1976) (cited in WISTRICH, su-
pra, at 23).
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